Google
 

Saturday, July 14, 2007

Tragedi Berdarah di Masjid Merah

Sabtu, 14 Juli 2007

Research Fellow pada Middle East and Islamic Transformative Studies Universitas Al Azhar Indonesia Jakarta serta Kandidat Doktor pada University Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM)

Pandangan masyarakat internasional sedang tertuju ke Pakistan. Media massa sibuk menjadikan peristiwa berdarah di Masjid Merah sebagai headlines. Ada apa sebenarnya? Inilah pertanyaan yang sangat boleh jadi menyelimuti banyak kalangan.

Militer Pakistan terlibat baku senjata dengan penduduk Pakistan yang diklaim sebagai kelompok militan yang menempati Masjid Lal (Masjid Merah) di tengah kota Islamabad. Banyak nyawa melayang dan ratusan lainnya terluka. Pemimpin kelompok yang menempati masjid, Abdul Rasyid Ghazi, pun meninggal tertembus peluru tajam pasukan komando Pakistan di persembunyian bawah tanah Masjid (Republika, 11/7). Sejak Pakistan merdeka dari Inggris pada 14 Agustus 1947, baru kali ini terjadi banjir darah di ibukota negara tersebut. Presiden Pakistan Jenderal Perves Musharraf hanya memberi dua opsi kepada kelompok yang menempati masjid itu, menyerah atau mati.

Musharraf gerah
Selama penulis menimba ilmu di Islamabad, para tokoh masyarakat di sekitar Masjid Lal dikenal santun. Jamaah di Masjid Lal juga tidak membuat aksi kekerasan ketika pada tahun 1998, Imam Masjid Lal yang juga Ketua Ahli Ru’yah Pakistan meninggal diberondong orang tak dikenal usai shalat Shubuh. Persis di samping area Masjid Lal adalah pusat perbelanjaan murah meriah. Masjid yang terletak berdekatan dengan Mabes Angkatan Laut Pakistan ini mulai disorot tajam ketika Musharraf secara mendadak mendukung aksi invasi AS ke Afghanistan pascatragedi 11/9.

Sejak keberpihakan itu, para khatib dan Imam di Masjid Lal hampir tidak pernah berhenti memojokkan posisi penguasa militer Pakistan. Padahal, di awal kepemimpinannya, Musharraf sangat dibanggakan oleh rakyat Pakistan karena berhasil mendepak pemerintahan sipil yang korup. Wajar, bila Musharraf gerah. Apalagi, Pemilu Nasional Pakistan tidak lama lagi akan digelar.

Tragedi berdarah di Masjid Lal sejatinya menggambarkan betapa pemerintah Jenderal Musharraf tidak lagi disenangi oleh rakyat Pakistan. Jika dulu Sang Jenderal disambut hangat dengan melengserkan PM Nawaz Sharif, maka kini ia tak lagi populer di mata warganya. Dukungan Islamabad dalam invasi militer Amerika ke Afghanistan adalah penyebab utamanya. Akibat kedekatannya dengan Washington, Musharraf terpaksa menangkapi rakyatnya sendiri dalam rangka memerangi jaringan terorisme yang diklaim Presiden Bush dan negara-negara Barat telah berpindah dari Afghanistan ke wilayah Pakistan.

Sejak rezim Taliban dilengserkan pada 13 Nopember 2001, banyak sisa-sisa Taliban yang bersembunyi di sepanjang wilayah perbatasan Pakistan dan Afghanistan. Sebab, penduduk di perbatasan mayoritas adalah suku Pusthun yang juga menjadi basis pendukung pemerintahan Taliban. Upaya Musharraf untuk menangkapi sisa-sisa Taliban dan pengikut Alqaidah juga tak berjalan mulus meski 80 ribu tentara Pakistan telah dikerahkan. Sedangkan pemerintah Presiden Bush selalu menyudutkan posisi Islamabad yang dinilai tak serius memberantas ‘kaum teroris’ di perbatasan Pakistan.

Posisi Jenderal Musharraf sendiri sangat dilematis. Ia berkali-kali mengalami upaya pembunuhan. Selama empat kali percobaan pembunuhan atas dirinya, Musharraf berhasil lolos dari incaran maut. Entahlah nantinya, hanya waktulah yang bisa menjawabnya. Dalam hemat penulis, ada tiga keuntungan sekaligus risiko yang tengah dihadapi Presiden Musharraf akibat mendukung perang melawan teror versi Bush. Pertama, dukungan Musharraf terhadap AS dalam war on terrorism di Afghanistan sangat menguntungkan Pakistan. Islamabad dikucuri bantuan dana sebesar 396,5 juta dolar AS atas bantuan informasi intelijen yang diberikan. Berbagai sanksi ekonomi dan militer yang dijatuhkan Washington akibat uji coba nuklir Pakistan tahun 1998 dihapuskan. Total dana yang mengalir ke kocek Musharraf mencapai 4,2 miliar dolar.

Kedua, Pakistan tidak lagi diisolasi dunia internasional. Jenderal Musharraf bisa tersenyum lega karena aksi kudetanya dulu membuat Pakistan dijauhi banyak negara. Ketiga, kerja sama militer Amerika dengan Pakistan yang terhenti sejak Perang Soviet melawan Afghan (1979 – 1989) telah dipulihkan. Ini sangat penting agar pasokan senjata dari Pentagon berjalan lancar sehingga Islamabad bisa menandingi kekuatan militer India, musuh bebuyutannya.

Sedangkan risiko yang harus dipikul Musharraf adalah pertama, Cina memandang curiga pada kedekatan Washington dengan Islamabad. Sebagai sekutu terdekat Cina, Pakistan diharapkan menjaga jarak dengan Amerika. Pemerintah Presiden Hu Jintao tak ingin Musharraf terlalu akrab dengan Bush karena kepentingan Beijing di kawasan Asia Selatan mulai dijegal.

Kedua, Jenderal Musharraf menghadapi aksi perlawanan dari rakyatnya sendiri yang benci AS. Di sebagian kalangan sipil dan bahkan militer Pakistan, Musharraf dituding berkomplot dengan Bush untuk membunuhi orang Islam dan menggadaikan kedaulatan negara Republik Islam Pakistan. Tak heran bila ada elemen militer di Pakistan yang juga ikut merancang pembunuhan atas Musharraf pada 13 Desember 2003. Sedangkan kalangan sipil radikal tak bosan berdemo dan melakukan aksi anarkis menentang kedekatan Musharraf dengan Washington.

Ketiga, Musharraf menghadapi resiko pembunuhan oleh sisa-sisa Taliban dan jaringan Alqaidah yang kini bertebaran di seantero wilayah Pakistan. Mereka ini terus berupaya melenyapkan nyawa Musharraf tanpa atau dengan bantuan elemen sipil-militer Pakistan. Alasannya jelas, Jenderal Musharraf terlibat dalam menghancurkan pemerintahan Islam di Afghanistan. Walhasil, banjir darah di Masjid Lal tak diragukan merupakan puncak perlawanan terhadap kedekatan pemerintah Musharraf dengan AS

Friday, April 6, 2007

The US-Iran Nuclear Standoff

JAKARTA: As local media pays more attention to domestic crises, from the natural disaster in West Sumatra to Lapindo Brantas in East Java, international issues seems overlooked.

The tension between the USA and the Islamic Republic of Iran has reached a peak. The Middle East is currently engulfed by a war cloud. Washington and Tehran are unfortunately likely to enter into armed conflict soon.

Three reasonable indications, at least, support this prediction. First, the Pentagon has already appointed Admiral William Fallon as the new US Central Command, replacing General John Abizaid. Fallon is charged with multiple and yet difficult tasks: keeping Afghanistan and Iraq stable which includes preparing attacks on Iran.

Second, the US has exercised its military power in the biggest war in the Middle East since 2003, involving use of aircraft carriers and hundreds of fighting jets. They underwent a similar exercise before the US military fired missiles on Iraq in 1991 (First Gulf War) and 2003 (Second Gulf War).

Third, Iran was unfortunately reluctant to halt its program of uranium enrichment, even though the UN Security Council recently issued its two resolutions (1737 in December 2006 and 1747 in March 2007).

Tehran’s behavior does not bode well for dialogue and only encourages Washington to invade Iran in the near future.

The international community would once again witness the shedding of blood at the beginning of the 21st century. After World War I (1914–18), World War II
(1939–45) and the Cold War (1948–90), a number of states still resorted to military force as a means to settle international disputes. In the first year of our third millennium, for instance, hundreds of thousands died in the US-Taliban conflict.

More than three million Afghans became refugees in Pakistan and Iran when the US and its coalition forces started bombing the Taliban regime on Oct. 7, 2001. In the name of combating terrorism and its networks, five US aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf fired 600 cruise missiles into all Iraqi territories on March 19, 2003.

The Taliban regime ended with the takeover of Kabul on Nov. 13, 2001 and Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003. The expansionist ambition of the US war planners apparently did not cease, but is instead increasingly on the rise.

Iran now becomes the next target of the US war machine.

And Syria, to a great extent, is possibly the most wanted after Tehran.

But why should the US attack Iran? President Bush’s administration has, of course, strong reasons to bomb Iran. Firstly, Washington accused Tehran of masterminding attacks against the US and its coalition in the post-Iraq war era.

Suicide and remote bombs are claimed to be the work of the Iranians. Secondly, the Iranian intelligence services were held responsible for supplying arms to Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon and to the Muslim freedom fighters in occupied Palestine where Israeli interests are threatened. Any attack on Israeli occupation forces would mean a declaration of war against the US.

Thirdly, the Iranian government has been deemed guilty of illegal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammed ElBaradei assured the world that Tehran needs years to acquire nuclear bombs, the Bush Administration has a different view: invading Iran before it is able to successfully test its nuclear weapons is the best preventative measure.

The refusal of President Ahmadinejad to stop Iranian uranium enrichment is seen by US policy makers as casus belli or smoking gun for mobilizing American military might in the Persian Gulf. Are we then to believe that war between the US and Iran is inevitable? There is no easy answer. Nevertheless, I am of the view that there is still an opportunity to avoid war.

First, the UN Security Council has to show its credibility as the world peacekeeper by pressuring the Bush Administration to avoid unilateral action. The US must not make the same mistake as before, when it failed to stem the US attacks on Iraq in 2003. It is the right time for countries such as France, China and Russia to use their veto powers and resist US arrogance. Second, Arab states under the Arab League should express their silenced voices to the US.

If Arab leaders stand united in solidarity, President Bush would not unilaterally attack Iran. Third, all Muslim countries listed in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) must also concur. As the largest world organization after the United Nations and Non-Alignment Movement, OIC could play a very important role.

If OIC member countries scattered across the Middle East, South Asian, Southeast Asian and African regions eventually stand together to implement boycotts or embargoes on the US, I believe Washington would face significant losses for taking any irresponsible action.

However, much depends on the United Nations, The Arab League and OIC. If they show reluctance to act, war is truly unavoidable. Consequently, one should stop dreaming that the US war machine can automatically come to a halt. Good Luck!

AH. Mahally (Abdul Halim Mahally) is an Associate Director for Middle East Studies at Research Center for Political Sciences, the University of Muhammadiyah Jakarta (UMJ).

http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=6500